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Abstract—In this paper, we study the impact of stealthy attacks
on the Cyber-Physical System (CPS) modeled as a stochastic
linear system. An attack is characterised by a malicious injection
into the system through input, output or both, and it is called
stealthy (resp. strictly stealthy) if it produces bounded changes
(resp. no changes) in the detection residue. Correspondingly,
a CPS is called vulnerable (resp. strictly vulnerable) if it
can be destabilized by a stealthy attack (resp. strictly stealthy
attack). We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
vulnerability and strictly vulnerability. For the invulnerable case,
we also provide a performance bound for the difference between
healthy and attacked system. Numerical examples are provided
to illustrate the theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), such as sensor networks,
smart grids and transportation systems, are widely used in
applications. Such a system combines a physical system with
network technology to greatly improve the efficiency of the
system. However, at the same time, this combination increases
the vulnerability of the system. In particular, CPSs are subject
to possible cyber attacks. At the physical system level, such
attacks are characterised by malicious injections into the
system through input, output or both.
The Stunex attack is one of the most famous CPS attack
till now [1]. In June 2010, a targeted virus was injected
into the Bushehr nuclear power plant through a USB flash
disk. The virus replaced the measurement data from the
centrifuges by a sequence of “normal” data to mislead the
fault detection system to trust that the system was operating
normally. Then, the virus injected input signals to accelerate
the centrifuges to self destruction. This incident was reported
to have caused a series of disastrous effects and destroyed over
3000 centrifuges [1]. The attacks like Stunex may penetrate
the traditional information protection framework(such as FDI)
of CPS.
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Other examples of CPS attacks include: the Maroochy
water breach [2], the blackout in brazil power grid [3], the
SQL Slammer attack in Davis-Besse nuclear power plant [4],
and many other industry security incidents [5]. According
to the statistical data from ICS-CERT (see https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov), there were 245 CPS attacks confirmed in 2014 and
the number increased to 295 in 2015.
CPS security has attracted many researchers to focus on this
area [6]. The traditional efforts, such as robust statistics [7]
and robust control [8], are designed to withstand certain types
of failures. The popular Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI)
method assumes that the failure is spontaneous [9], [10], [11].
However, CPS attacks are usually purposely designed to be
stealthy and destructive, and are often done with the full
or partial knowledge of the system dynamic model. Thus, it
is insufficient to rely on robust control or FDI against CPS
attacks. As shown in [12], an attacker can take advantage of
the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to
successfully bypass the existing techniques for bad measure-
ment detection.
For a CPS with a linear dynamic model for the physical sys-
tem, many studies have been done in the detection and analysis
of malicious attacks. The work of [13] studied the performance
of an average consensus algorithm when individual agents in a
networked system are under attack. In [14], the authors studied
the detectability of attacks and pointed out that, for a noiseless
system, the only undetectable space for attacks is due to the
unknown initial state. In [15], an algorithm was offered to
detect attacked sensors in a multi-sensors network. The work
of [16] analyzed the performance of an attacked system and
studied the stabilization problem using state feedback.
The above works all assumed that the physical system
is noiseless, which is very restrictive. System noises would
give a shelter for attacks because they may be mistaken for
noises. For static systems subject to noises, [17] utilized a
general evaluation standard to study the robustness of the
network cluster mechanism against attacks; In [18], the
authors considered the estimation problem in a smart grid and
studied how does an undetectable attack change the state of
the system.
For dynamic systems subject to noises, [19] studied the
performance of Kalman Filter under attacks. They further
studied the attack strategy and calculated the miss/false alarm
rates of a χ2 attack detector [20]. In [21], they also worked
on the design of robust estimators against attacks for multi-
sensors systems. Besides, [22] develop an adaptive controller
that guarantees uniform ultimate boundedness of the closed-
loop dynamical system in the face of adversarial sensor and
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2actuator attacks. The works in [23], [24] extend the results to
the cyber-physical systems subject to exogenous disturbances
and leader-follower multiagent systems, respectively.
A lot of studies have also been done on special types of
attacks. Zhang et. al. focused on the energy-constrained attack
scheduling problem for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [25].
Zhao et. al. studied the effect of stealthy attacks on consensus-
based distributed economic dispatch [26]. Kung et. al. defined
an -stealthy attack and analyzed its effect for scalar sys-
tems [27]. In [28], the authors worked on the multi-channel
transmission schedule problem for remote state estimation
under DoS attacks.
In this paper, we focus on a stochastic linear system under
both sensor and actuator attacks. Firstly, we consider stealthy
attacks or strictly stealthy attacks whose corresponding effect
on the detection residue is either bounded or zero. It is noted
that a stealthy attack is practically difficult to detect and a
strictly stealthy attack is theoretically impossible to detect.
We then study system’s vulnerability under such attacks. A
system is said to be vulnerable if it can be destabilized by a
stealthy attack, or strictly vulnerable if it can be destabilized by
a strictly stealthy attack. We give the necessary and sufficient
conditions for both vulnerable systems and strictly vulnerable
systems. To further study the performance of invulnerable
system under stealthy attacks, we give a performance bound
for the difference between healthy system and attacked system.
These results will help to understand what kind of systems are
robust to stealthy attacks and how to reduce their impact on
the performance.
Focusing on a standard stochastic linear system equipped
with state feedback controller and Romberg state observer,
the contributions of this paper are mainly in two-folds: 1)
The necessary and sufficient strict vulnerability/vulnerability
conditions are given. The designers of Cyber-physical systems
can check the robustness of system under stealthy attacks and
understand what sensor/actuator channels are critical to the
vulnerability; 2) A universal upper bound for the performance
is given. The designers of Cyber-physical systems can evaluate
the damage caused by attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we describe the models of CPS and attacks under
our study. In Section III, we introduce the definitions of
stealthy and strictly stealthy attacks. The notions of vulner-
ability and strictly vulnerability are defined according to the
destabilizability of stealthy and strictly stealthy attacks. The
necessary and sufficient conditions for strict vulnerability and
vulnerability are given in Sections IV and V, respectively. The
invulnerable system’s performance bound for the difference
between healthy and attacked systems is given in Section VI.
In Section VII, examples are given to illustrate the theoretical
results. Concluding remarks are stated in Section VIII. Some
proofs are left in the Appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
In this paper, the Cyber-physical system is modeled as a
linear discrete-time stochastic system in state-space form
xt+1 = Axt +But + wt, (1)
yt = Cxt + vt, (2)
where the state xt ∈ Rn, the measurement yt ∈ Rm and
the control input ut ∈ Rp. The process noise wt ∈ Rn
and the measurement noise vt ∈ Rm obey some zero-mean
stochastic distributions. Moreover, A ∈ Rn×n is the system
matrix, B ∈ Rn×p is the actuator matrix and C ∈ Rm×n is
the measurement matrix. In the rest of paper, it is assumed
that (A,C) is observable and (A,B) is controllable.
Furthermore, the control input ut is assumed to be generated
by a steady-state controller. To be specific, a steady-state
controller is given by
ut = Lxˆt, (3)
where xˆt is generated by the estimator in (4) below and L ∈
Rp×n is chosen such that A+BL is stable.
We assume a linear time-invariant Luenberger estimator is
being deployed, which has the following form:
xˆt+1 = Axˆt +But +K[yt+1 − C(Axˆt +But)], (4)
where K is chosen such that A−KCA is stable.
Remark 1. Other than the constraint that both A + BL and
A−KCA are stable, the choices of L and K are arbitrary.
We define the innovation signal zt as
zt+1 = yt+1 − C(Axˆt +But), (5)
and the estimation error et as
et = xt − xˆt.
Combining (1) and (4), one can prove that et follows the
following recursive equation:
et+1 = (A−KCA)et + (I −KC)wt −Kvt+1. (6)
B. Attack Model
In this paper, we assume that the adversary can inject an
external control input and manipulate a subset of the sensory
data. Therefore, system under the attack can be described by
the following equations:
x′t+1 = Ax
′
t +Bu
′
t +B
auat + wt, (7)
y′t = Cx
′
t + Γ
ayat + vt, (8)
where we use (·)′ to denote the variable · under attack, uat ∈
Rpa is the actuator attack signal, yat ∈ Rma is the sensor attack
signal1, Ba ∈ Rn×pa is the actuator attack matrix and Γa ∈
Rm×ma =
[
ei1 . . . eima
]
is the sensor attack matrix, where
ei are the ith canonical basis vector of Rm, and {i1, . . . , ima}
1In this paper, we do not put any constraint on uat and y
a
t except that they
need to satisfy stealthy or strictly stealthy requirement, which is introduced
later in Section III.
3is the set of the compromised sensors. Moreover, the attack is
assumed to start at time 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that both Ba and Γa
are full column rank.2 The dimension pa and ma of the attack
signal uat , y
a
t represent the attacks’ degrees of freedom.
In order to consider the worst-case scenario for the CPS,
the attacker is assumed to know the full system model (1)-(2).
In the presence of the adversary, the steady-state estimator
and controller are given by
xˆ′t+1 = Axˆ
′
t +Bu
′
t +K[y
′
t+1 − C(Axˆ′t +Bu′t)], (9)
u′t = Lxˆ
′
t.
The innovation signal and estimation error are updated as
z′t+1 = y
′
t+1 − C(Axˆ′t +Bu′t), (10)
e′t = x
′
t − xˆ′t. (11)
The difference between an attacked system and the healthy
system is characterized by
4xt , x′t − xt, 4xˆt , xˆ′t − xˆt,
4ut , u′t − ut, 4yt , y′t − yt,
4zt , z′t − zt, 4et , e′t − et. (12)
The difference variables are of particular interest for the
adversary and will be the focus in the rest of the paper. To
be specific, ∆zt and ∆yt can be used to characterize the
stealthiness of the attack. An intrusion detector employed by
the CPS is unable (or hardly able) to distinguish a healthy
system and a compromised system if 4zt and 4yt are zero
(or small enough). The quantities 4xt and 4et can be used
to quantify the damage caused by the attack.
Remark 2. Since we assume that the attacks start at time 1,
the biases between healthy and attacked system are all zeroes
at time 0, i.e., 4e0 = 0,4x0 = 0 and 4z0 = 0.
III. CLASSIFICATIONS FOR SYSTEMS AND ATTACKS
In this section, we shall classify the attacks depending on
the stealthiness of the attack. Since the input of any detector
is the sensory data {y′t : t ∈ N}, and there is a one-to-one
mapping between the residual error sequence {z′t : t ∈ N}
and the sensory data, we analyze the difference between the
attacked system’s z′t and the healthy system’s zt, i.e., 4zt, to
determine if an attack can be detected or not. An attack is
impossible to be detected if
‖4zt‖ = 0,∀t ∈ N. (13)
In practice, an attack is hardly detectable if 4zt is small
enough, i.e., there exist δ > 0 such that
‖4zt‖ ≤ δ, ∀t ∈ N. (14)
Remark 3. As proved by Theorem 1 in [20], for a linear
Gaussian system monitored by a χ2 detector, the alarm rate
2If Ba is not full column rank, then certain column of Ba can be
represented by a linear combination of other columns, i.e., the effect of certain
malicious actuator on the system can be duplicated by the combined effect of
several other malicious actuators. Therefore, removing the redundant actuator
and corresponding column in Ba will not change the attacker’s capability.
converges to the false alarm rate as δ → 0. Moreover, Bai
et al. [29] have proven a similar result for other forms of
detectors.
Based on the above, the classification of attacks is given
below.
Definition 1. An attack sequence is said to be stealthy if (14)
is satisfied for some δ > 0 and strictly stealthy if (13) holds.
By substracting (10) from (5) and (9) from (4), we have
4xˆt+1 = (A+BL)4xˆt +K4zt+1, (15)
4yt+1 = 4zt+1 + C(A+BL)4xˆt. (16)
Based on the definitions of 4zt and 4et, their update
equations are given by
4et+1
= (I −KC)A4et + (I −KC)Bauat −KΓayat+1, (17)
and
4zt+1 = 4yt+1 − C(A+BL)4xˆt
= CA4et + CBauat + Γayat+1. (18)
Noted that both 4zt and 4et depend only on the attack
signals.
A system is resilient under the attacks if both
lim supt→∞ ‖4xt‖ < ∞ and lim supt→∞ ‖4et‖ < ∞.
The following lemma shows that we only need to check one
of the conditions instead of both.
Lemma 1. For a stealthy or strictly stealthy attack on
the system (1)-(2), a necessary and sufficient condition for
lim supt→∞ ‖4xt‖ <∞ is
lim sup
t→∞
‖4et‖ <∞. (19)
Proof. Based on the notations in (12), we have
4xt = (xˆ′t + e′t)− (xˆt + et) = 4xˆt +4et. (20)
Recall the equation (15), we have
4xˆt+1 = (A+BL)4xˆt +K4zt+1.
Since A + BL is stable and ∆zk is bounded due to the
stealthy (or strictly stealthy) requirement in (13) and (14),
the variable 4xˆt is bounded for any t ∈ N. Therefore,
the condition lim supt→∞ ‖4et‖ < ∞ is equivalent to
lim supt→∞ ‖4xt‖ <∞.
In the rest of paper, we will use the boundness of
lim supt→∞ ‖4et‖ to represent the resilience under attacks.
Combining with the classification of attacks in Definition 1,
we can classify a system (1)-(2) depending on if there exists a
stealthy (or strictly stealthy) attack to introduce an unbounded
estimation error ∆et (or bias on the state ∆xt).
Definition 2. The linear system in (1)-(2) is said to be
vulnerable (or strictly vulnerable) if, for any M1 > 0, there
exists a stealthy (or strictly stealthy) attack such that
lim sup
t→∞
‖4et‖ > M1. (21)
4And the system is invulnerable (or strictly invulnerable) if
there exists M2 > 0 such that
lim sup
t→∞
‖4et‖ ≤M2 (22)
for any stealthy (or strictly stealthy) attacks.
Remark 4. The vulnerability and strict vulnerability of a sys-
tem are important concepts for system security. That a system
is strictly invulnerable means that it is always stable under any
attacks that have no influence on the residue. Meanwhile, that
a system is invulnerable means that it is always stable under
any attacks that have bounded influence on the residue. Thus,
the invulnerable system is more robust to the attacks. We will
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for vulnerability
and strict vulnerability in the following Sections IV and V,
respectively.
IV. THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
STRICT VULNERABILITY
This section is devoted to the characterization of strictly
vulnerable systems.
Definition 3. Consider the following linear system with initial
state x0 = 0:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk, yk = Cxk +Duk. (23)
The above system is said to be invertible if yk = 0 for all
k ∈ N implies that uk = 0 for all k ∈ N3.
Remark 5. If a system is invertible, the mapping from the
input {uk : k ∈ N} to the output {yk : k ∈ N} is injective,
which means that different input will result in different output.
In particular, any non-zero input will result in an non-zero
output.
In particular, one can check the invertibility of a linear
system using the following rank conditions, the proof of which
can be found in [32].
Proposition 1. The linear system in (23) is invertible if and
only if
rank(Mn)− rank(Mn−1) = dim(uk), (24)
where
Mi =

D 0 0 · · · 0
CB D 0 · · · 0
CAB CB D · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
CAi−1B CAi−2B CAi−3B · · · D

and n is the dimension of state xk.
Furthermore, a complementary lemma is given to show the
invertibility equivalence of two systems.
Lemma 2. The system in (23) is not invertible if and only if
x′k+1 = (A+KC)x
′
k + (B +KD)u
′
k, y
′
k = Cx
′
k +Du
′
k. (25)
is not invertible for any gain matrix K.
3The invertible system defined here is called left invertible in [30], [31].
Furthermore, if {uk} is a non-zero sequence of input for
system (23) such that yk = 0 for all k, then u′k = uk is a
sequence of non-zero input for system (25) such that y′k = 0
for all k.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Before giving the necessary and sufficient condition for
strict vulnerability, we need one additional lemma:
Lemma 3. Suppose the system (23) is non-invertible, and[
B
D
]
has full column rank, then there exists a non-zero input
sequence {uk}, such that the following holds:
lim sup
k
‖xk‖ → ∞, and yk = 0,∀k. (26)
Proof. Since the system is non-invertible, there exists a non-
zero sequence of input {uk}, such that the corresponding yk =
0 for all k. Without loss of generality, we shall assume that
u0 6= 0, otherwise we can always trim the leading zero inputs
in the sequence {uk}. Now notice that[
x1
y0
]
=
[
A
C
]
x0 +
[
B
D
]
u0 =
[
B
D
]
u0. (27)
The fact that
[
B
D
]
has full column rank and u0 6= 0 implies
that one of x1 and y0 is non-zero. Since yk is constantly 0, we
conclude that x1 6= 0. Without loss of generality, by proper
scaling of uk, we can assume that ‖x1‖ = 1.
Now if lim supk ‖xk‖ → ∞, then we finish the proof.
Otherwise, suppose that supk ‖xk‖ ≤ M . We can recreate
an input sequence 4 u′k , such that
u′k =
k∑
i=0
(2M + 1)k−iui. (28)
Based on the property of linear systems, the corresponding
state x′k and measurement y
′
k satisfy that
x′k =
k∑
i=0
(2M + 1)k−ixi,
y′k =
k∑
i=0
(2M + 1)k−iyi = 0.
Thus, we have
‖x′k‖ ≥ (2M + 1)k−1‖x1‖ −
k∑
i=2
(2M + 1)k−i‖xi‖
≥ (2M + 1)k−1 −
k∑
i=2
(2M + 1)k−iM
=
(2M + 1)k−1 + 1
2
.
It is obvious that lim supk→∞ ‖x′k‖ =∞.
4The design of u′k utilizes the linearity combination property [33], which
guarantees both y′k = 0 for all k ∈ N and x′k =
∑k
i=0(2M + 1)
k−ixk .
Moreover, the item (2M + 1) is used to ensure the divergence of x′k .
5We can now provide the necessary and sufficient condition
for strict vulnerability:
Theorem 1. The system (1)-(2) is strictly vulnerable if and
only if the following system is not invertible:
xk+1 = Axk +
[
Ba 0
]
ζk, (29)
yk = CAxk +
[
CBa Γa
]
ζk, (30)
where ζk =
[
uak
yak+1
]
is the input of system (29)-(30).
Proof. Sufficiency: Firstly, based on Lemma 2, the fact that
system (29)-(30) is not invertible implies that the following
system is not invertible for any K:
xk+1 = (A−KCA)xk
+
[
Ba −KCBa −KΓa] ζk, (31)
yk = CAxk +
[
CBa Γa
]
ζk. (32)
Notice that[
I
−C I
] [
I K
I
] [
Ba −KCBa −KΓa
CBa Γa
]
=
[
Ba
Γa
]
Therefore,
[
Ba −KCBa −KΓa
CBa Γa
]
has full column rank and
by Lemma 3, there exists a sequence of ζk to make xk
unbounded and yk = 0 for all k.
Note that (31)-(32) is an alternative expression of (17)-(18)
for the dynamics of4et and4zt. Hence, there exists a strictly
stealthy attack to make ∆zt = 0 and ∆et →∞.
Necessity: Suppose the system (1)-(2) is strictly vulnerable,
then there exists a non-zero input {ζk : k ∈ N} such that
yk = 0 for all k ∈ N in (32). This means that the system
(31)-(32) is non-invertible. Based on Lemma 2, the system
(29)-(30) is also not invertible.
We can further simplify our invertibility condition in The-
orem 1 as follows.
Corollary 1. The system (1)-(2) is strictly vulnerable if and
only if the following system is not invertible:
x′k+1 = Ax
′
k +
[
Ba 0
]
ζ ′k, y
′
k = Cx
′
k +
[
0 Γa
]
ζ ′k. (33)
Proof. We only need to prove that the system (29)-(30) is not
invertible if and only if (33) is not invertible: Suppose that
the input ζk for system (29)-(30) is of the form ζk =
[
uak
yak+1
]
.
Then let
ζ ′k =
[
uak
yak
]
,
it follows that5
x′k = xk, y
′
k = yk−1.
Therefore, the system (29)-(30) is non-invertible if and only
if (33) is non-invertible.
Remark 6. From the viewpoint of structured linear system,
one can use Theorem 2 in [34] to derive the generic rank of
5We assume that y−1 = ya−1 = 0.
the transfer function of the system described in (33) and thus
check if the system is left invertible or not (i.e., if the transfer
function from the input to the output is full row rank or not.)
V. THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
VULNERABILITY
Next, we study the necessary and sufficient condition for
vulnerability.
Definition 4. The set V is invariant if, for any v ∈ V , there
exists u such that
Aυ +Bu ∈ V,Cυ +Du = 0. (34)
Let Vm be the maximum invariant subspace, the existence of
which is proven in [35]. The maximum reachable invariant set
is given by6
V ∗ = span
(
B AB . . . An−1B
) ∩ Vm. (35)
A property of the maximum reachable invariant set is shown
below.
Lemma 4. If the system (23) is invertible, for each x ∈ V ∗,
then there exists a unique u such that
Ax+Bu ∈ V ∗, Cx+Du = 0. (36)
Moreover, there exists a matrix Q such that u = Qx for
every pairs (x, u) satisfying (36).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Before the proof of necessary and sufficient condition for
vulnerability, a notation is defined to facilitate Lemmas 5-7.
Definition 5. The system
xk+1 = (A+BQ)xk, yk = (C +DQ)xk (37)
has unstable reachable zero-dynamic, if there exist a vector v
satisfying the following conditions:
1) v is an unstable eigenvector of A + BQ and its corre-
sponding eigenvalue is λ with |λ| ≥ 1;
2) (C +DQ)v = 0;
3) v is reachable for (A,B).
Remark 7. The unstable reachable zero-dynamic in Defini-
tion 5 contains three parts:
1) The existence of zero-dynamic space for (37), which
guarantees that the output (i.e., residue) is bounded;
2) The zero-dynamic space contains an unstable eigen-space
of (37), which makes the state diverge;
3) The reachability of v, which implies that a vector
satisfying 1) and 2) can be reached by certain sequence of
input uk.
Next, we provide a lemma on the zero-dynamic property to
study the sufficiency conditions for vulnerability.
6The invariant set V here is also called output-nulling controlled invariant
subspace in [31] and [35]. Especially, the maximum reachable invariant set
V ∗ is called the maximum output-nulling controlled invariant subspace.
6Lemma 5. Consider the system (23), for any M > 0, there
exists a stealthy input sequence {uk : k ∈ N} such that
lim sup
k→∞
‖xk‖ > M,
‖yk‖ ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N,
if there exists a matrix Q such that the system (37) has unstable
reachable zero-dynamic.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The following two lemmas on the conditions for zero-
dynamic are needed for studying the necessity conditions for
vulnerability.
Lemma 6. Suppose the system (23) is non-invertible, then
there exists a matrix Q such that the system (37) has unstable
reachable zero-dynamic.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Lemma 7. Consider an invertible system (23) with ker(B)∩
ker(D) = ∅. Suppose that, for any M > 0, there exists a
stealthy input sequence {uk : k ∈ N} such that
lim sup
k→∞
‖xk‖ > M,
‖yk‖ ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N,
then there exists a matrix Q such that the system (37) has
unstable reachable zero-dynamic.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Based on the results in Lemmas 5-7, the main result on
vulnerability is given below.
Theorem 2. The system (1)-(2) is vulnerable if and only if
there exists a vector v and matrix Q satisfying the following
conditions:
1) v is an unstable eigenvector of A + BaQ and its
corresponding eigenvalue is λ with |λ| ≥ 1;
2) Cv ∈ span(Γa);
3) v is reachable for (A−KCA, [Ba −KCBa −KΓa]).
Proof. Sufficiency:. We need to show that conditions 1)-3)
imply vulnerability.
Since Cv ∈ span(Γa), there exist a vector y∗ such that
Cv = Γay∗ and a matrix W such that λy∗ = −Wv. Taking
a gain matrix
[
Q
W
]
, then
[CA+
[
CBa Γa
] [Q
W
]
]v = C(A+BaQ)v + ΓaWv
= λCv − λΓay∗
= 0 (38)
and
[(A−KCA) + [Ba −KCBa −KΓa] [Q
W
]
]v
= (A+BaQ)v −K[C(A+BaQ)v + ΓaWv]
= λv. (39)
Till now, we know that the unstable eigenvector v of
[(A − KCA) + [Ba −KCBa −KΓa] [Q
W
]
] satisfies the
condition 1)-2) in Definition 5 for system (31)-(32) (the same
as system (17)-(18) for 4et and 4zt).
Combining with that v is reachable for
(A − KCA, [Ba −KCBa −KΓa]), the condition 3)
in Definition 5 is satisfied. Thus, based on the Lemma 5, the
system (31)-(32) can be destabilized by a stealthy input, i.e.,
the system (1)-(2) is vulnerable.
Necessity: We need to show that vulnerability implies
conditions 1)-3).
Note that Ba and Γa are both full column rank. Re-
call the proof of Theorem 1, we have already proved that[
Ba −KCBa −KΓa
CBa Γa
]
has full column rank, i.e.,
ker
[
Ba −KCBa −KΓa] ∩ ker [CBa Γa] = ∅
for any matrix K.
We will separate the rest of the proof into two cases:
1) Suppose the system (31)-(32) is non-invertible:
Following the Lemma 6, there exists a vector υ and gain
matrix Ψ such that
(a) υ is an unstable eigenvector of the following matrix
A−KCA+ [Ba −KCBa −KΓa]Ψ. (40)
(b) υ satisfies that
[CA+
[
CBa Γa
]
Ψ]υ = 0. (41)
(c) υ is reachable for (A−KCA, [Ba −KCBa −KΓa]).
2) Suppose that the system in (31) and (32) is invertible:
Based on the result in Lemma 7, (a)-(c) also holds.
Let Ψ =
[
Q
W
]
, from (41), we have
[CA+ CBaQ+ ΓaW ]υ = 0. (42)
Combining (42) with the fact that υ is an unstable eigen-
vector of (40), we have
[A−KCA+BaQ−KCBaQ−KΓaW ]υ
= (A+BaQ)υ −K(CA+ CBaQ+ ΓaW )υ
= (A+BaQ)υ = λυ. (43)
Therefore, υ is also an unstable eigenvector of A + BaQ.
Recall that (42) implies
λCυ = −ΓaWυ.
That is, Cυ ∈ span(Γa). Hence, conditions 1)-3) all hold.
Remark 8. It is worth to note that the value of δ > 0 in stealthy
condition (14) is independent of the vulnerability condition.
This is due to the linearity of the system. The adversary can
always scale its attack to make ∆zt arbitrarily small, while
making ∆et diverge.
Remark 9. Following Definition 5 and Lemmas 5-7, the
vulnerability condition in Theorem 2 can be divided into three
parts:
71) The existence of a non-trivial output-nulling invariant
subspace for system (31)-(32);
2) There exists a unstable eigenvector v of (A + BaQ)
belonging to the above output-nulling invariant subspace;
3) This unstable eigenvector v is reachable for (A −
KCA,
[
Ba −KCBa −KΓa]).
The existence of output-nulling invariant subspace in 1)
can be checked through the structural knowledge of linear
system [34]. On the other hand, conditions 2)-3) are not
generic properties and cannot be evaluated using structural
only information. Hence, the structural information about the
system can provide a necessary condition on whether the
system is vulnerable.
VI. A PERFORMANCE BOUND FOR INVULNERABLE
SYSTEM
Following the necessary and sufficient condition for vul-
nerability in Theorem 2, we understand that the bias 4et
between the healthy and an attacked systems is bounded when
the condition is not satisfied. In this section, focusing on the
invulnerable system, we will give a performance bound for the
bias 4et under stealthy attacks.
Recall that in (17) and (18), letting ζt =
[
uat
yat+1
]
, we have
4zt+1 = CA4et +
[
CBa Γa
]
ζt,
and
4et+1 = (I −KC)A4et +
[
(I −KC)Ba −KΓa] ζt.
By taking the z-transformation on both 4zt+1 and 4et+1,
it deduces
4e(z) = (zI − (I −KC)A)−1
· [(I −KC)Ba −KΓa] ζ(z)
= T (z)ζ(z) (44)
and
4z(z) = [CA(zI − (I −KC)A)−1
· [(I −KC)Ba −KΓa]+ [CBa Γa]]ζ(z)
= S(z)ζ(z), (45)
where T (z) = (zI− (I−KC)A)−1 [(I −KC)Ba −KΓa]
and S(z) = CA(zI − (I −
KC)A)−1
[
(I −KC)Ba −KΓa]+ [CBa Γa].
Before the main result, we firstly introduce some new
definitions to facilitate the analysis.
Definition 6. For a vector or matrix sequence {ξt : t ∈ N}, we
use ξ to denote the whole sequence. If ξ is a vector sequence,
we define
‖ξ‖∞,2 = sup
t∈N
‖ξt‖2 ,
and if it is a matrix sequence, we define
‖ξ‖1,sp =
∑
t∈N
‖ξt‖sp ,
where ‖·‖sp denotes the spectral norm, i.e.,
‖ξt‖sp = sup‖x‖2=1
‖ξtx‖ .
Then, a lemma is required by the proof of main result in
this section.
Lemma 8. Suppose that the system in (1)-(2) is invulnerable
and the attack {yat , uat : t ∈ N} is stealthy, then we have
ker (T (z)) ⊇ ker (S(z)) , for all |z| = 1 (46)
and
‖R‖1,sp <∞, (47)
where ‖R‖1,sp =
∑
s∈N ‖Rs‖sp, Rs = Z−1(R(z)), R(z) =
T (z)S†(z) and Z−1(·) is the inverse z-transformation.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Based on the properties for invulnerable system in
Lemma 8, a bound for 4ek is given in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the system in (1)-(2) is invulnerable
and the attack {yat , uat : t ∈ N} is stealthy, for any k ∈ N, we
have
‖4ek‖2 ≤ ‖R‖1,spδ, (48)
where δ is the stealthy bound for the residue defined in (14).
Proof. Based on the Lemma 8, it follows from (46) that
ker (T (z)) ⊇ ker (S(z)) , for all |z| = 1.
It is known that T †(z)T (z) is the projection onto ker(T (z))
and S†(z)S(z) is the projection onto ker(S(z)). For that
ker (T (z)) ⊇ ker (S(z)), we can pre-multiply T †(z)T (z) by
S†(z)S(z) without changing the result.
Then, from (44) and (45), we have
4e(z) = T (z)ζ(z) = T (z)T †(z)T (z)ζ(z)
= T (z)T †(z)T (z)S†(z)S(z)ζ(z)
= T (z)S†(z)(S(z)ζ(z))
= R(z)4z(z). (49)
From (49), it follows that,
4e = TS†4z = R4z,
or equivalently,
4et =
∑
s∈Z
Rs4zt−s.
Thus, combining with the boundness of ‖R‖1,sp in
Lemma 8, for all k ∈ Z,
‖4ek‖2 ≤
∑
s∈Z
‖Rs‖sp ‖4zk−s‖2 ≤ ‖R‖1,sp ‖4z‖∞,2
≤ ‖R‖1,sp δ,
and it completes the proof.
Remark 10. From (44) and (45), the quantity T (z)S†(z) can
be roughly viewed as a transition function from 4z(z) to
4e(z).
Remark 11. Since
4xˆt+1 = (A+BL)4xˆt +K4zt+1,
8combining with that A + BL is stable and ∆zk is bounded
due to the stealthy requirement in (14), we can easily get the
bound of ‖4xˆt‖2. Thus, the bound of ‖4xt‖2 follows from
‖4xt‖2 ≤ ‖4xˆt‖2 + ‖4et‖2.
VII. SIMULATION
In this section, numerical examples are given to verify our
proposed results in Theorem 1-3. We first consider a double
integrator from [20] below:
xt+1 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
xt +
[
1
0
]
ut +B
auat + wt,
yt = xt + Γ
ayat + vt. (50)
The stationary estimator gain is given by K =
[
0.6 0
−1.4 1.6
]
.
The attack is stealthy if
‖4zt‖ ≤ 1
for all t ∈ N, and strictly stealthy if
‖4zt‖ = 0.
In the rest of section, we will show that the different
choices of sensor attack matrix Γa and actuator attack matrix
Ba will make the system vulnerable, strictly vulnerable or
invulnerable.
1) The attack matrices Ba =
[
1
0
]
,Γa =
[
1 0
0 1
]
:
Following Theorem 1, the system is strictly vulnerable.
Thus, a strictly stealthy attack sequence is designed by (28)
and its effects on the norms of 4et and 4zt are shown in
Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. The evolution of 4et and 4zt
From Figure 1, the system is destabilized by an attack
while the residue bias is always zero, which confirms the strict
vulnerability criterion in Theorem 1.
2) The attack matrices Ba = 0,Γa =
[
0
1
]
:
Following Theorems 1 and 2, the system is vulnerable but
not strictly vulnerable. A stealthy attack sequence is designed
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Fig. 2. The evolution of 4et and 4zt.
by (54), and the norms of4et and4zt are plotted in Figure 2.
From Figure 2, the estimation error bias between the healthy
and attacked system diverges while the residual bias is kept
bounded. This confirms the vulnerability criterion in Theo-
rem 1.
3) The attack matrices Ba = 0,Γa =
[
1
0
]
:
Following Theorem 2, the system is invulnerable for all
stealthy attacks. We plot the reachable set for 4et under all
possible stealthy attacks in Figure 3 to show the system’s
robustness. Moreover, in the same figure, we also curve the
universal bound for 4et from Theorem 3.
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The universal bound for the reachable set
Fig. 3. The reachable set of 4et and its universal bound.
The dots in Figure 3 make up the reachable set of4et. From
Figure 3, the estimation error bias for invulnerable system is
9always bounded under all stealthy attacks and its universal
bound from Theorem 3 is tight and effective.
The system in (50) is simply designed to illustrate the
strict/non-strict vulnerability and invulnerability properties. To
show our analysis for practical system, we have introduced the
well-known Tennessee Eastman Process for further simulation.
Tennessee Eastman Process (TEP) is a commonly used process
proposed by Downs and Vogel in [36]. In this simulation, we
adopt a simplified version of TEP from [37], as follows:
x˙ = Ax+Bu+Baua + w,
y = Cx+ Γaya + v, (51)
where A,B and C are constant matrices 7.
The TEP system is a MIMO system of order n =
8 with p = 4 inputs and m = 10 outputs. We dis-
cretize the system using the control system toolbox in MAT-
LAB by selecting a sample period of 1 second. Moreover,
we take Ba =
[
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
]>
and Γa =[
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
]>
. Moreover, the covari-
ance matrices Q for w and R for v are assumed to be identity
matrices with proper dimensions.
Similar to that in Figure 3, we compute the 8-dimensional
reachable set of the TEP model and project it onto a 2-
dimensional plant and show that our universal bound from
Theorem 3 is still effective.
−0.25 −0.2 −0.15 −0.1 −0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
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The universal bound for the reachable set
Fig. 4. The reachable set of 4et and its universal bound for the TEP Model.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the definitions of vulnerable and strictly
vulnerable systems have been given for a stochastic linear
system. A system is strictly vulnerable means that it can
be destabilized by an attack that have no influence on the
residue. Meanwhile, a system is vulnerable means that it can
be destabilized by an attack that have bounded influence on
7For more details about this dynamic model, please refer to Appendix I
in [37].
the residue. The necessary and sufficient vulnerability and
strict vulnerability conditions have been provided in this paper,
which ensure the stability under stealthy and strictly stealthy
attacks, respectively. Furthermore, for an invulnerable system,
a performance bound for the bias between healthy and attacked
system has also been given. The vulnerability condition shows
what kind of system is robust to stealthy attacks and the
performance bound shows how performance is affected by the
stealthy attacks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Necessity: The system in (23) being not invertible means
that there exist a nonzero input {uk : k ∈ N} such that x0 =
0, yk = 0 for all k ∈ N. Then, recall that in (25), we have
x′k+1 = (A+KC)x
′
k + (B +KD)u
′
k
= Ax′k +Bu
′
k +Ky
′
k. (52)
This implies that taking u′k = uk for all k ∈ N will make
x′0 = 0, y
′
k = 0 for all k ∈ N. Thus, the system in (25) is also
not invertible.
Sufficiency: Suppose that there exist a nonzero input {u′k :
k ∈ N} such that x′0 = 0, y′k = 0. Recalling (52), we have
y′k = Cx
′
k +Du
′
k = 0,
x′k+1 = (A+KC)x
′
k + (B +KD)u
′
k
= Ax′k +Bu
′
k +Ky
′
k = Ax
′
k +Bu
′
k.
This will make xk = x′k, yk = 0 in (25) for all k by letting
uk = u
′
k for all k, i.e., the system in (23) is not invertible.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We will first prove the uniqueness of u by contradiction.
Suppose there exists u 6= u′, such that
Ax+Bu ∈ V ∗, Cx+Du = 0,
Ax+Bu′ ∈ V ∗, Cx+Du′ = 0.
By linearity of the system, we have
0 +B(u− u′) = x1 ∈ V ∗, D(u− u′) = 0.
By the property of the invariant set, there exist uk (k ≥ 1)
and corresponding xk (k ≥ 2), such that
Axk +Buk = xk+1 ∈ V ∗, Cxk +Duk = 0,∀k ≥ 1.
As a result, the non-zero control input sequence u0 = u−
u′, u1, u2, . . . results in zero output for the system, which
contradicts with the assumption that the system is invertible.
Thus, u satisfying (36) is unique for each x ∈ V ∗.
Now we show the existence of Q. Suppose that the basis of
V ∗ is given by {x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗n∗}, then there exists a unique
set {u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗n∗} such that
Ax∗i +Bu
∗
i ∈ V ∗,
Cx∗i +Du
∗
i = 0
for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n∗.
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The matrix Q is defined as a transition matrix from
{x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗n∗} to {u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗n∗}, i.e., u∗i = Qx∗i for any
i = 1, 2, . . . , n∗. Taking arbitrary x = a1x∗1 + . . . + an∗x
∗
n∗ ,
we have u = a1u∗1 + . . .+ an∗u
∗
n∗ such that
Ax+Bu ∈ V ∗, Cx+Du = 0,
and u = Qx always hold.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Recall the notations in Definition 5, since the unsta-
ble eigenvector v is reachable for (A,B), there exists
u0, u1, . . . , un−1 such that
xn = v.
Moreover, we can manipulate the magnitude of v to satisfy
that ‖yk‖ ≤ δ for all k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
Then, we separate the proof into two cases:
1) Suppose |λ| > 1. A sequence of input is designed as
uk = λ
k−nQv (53)
for any k ≥ n.
Under the input designed above, it follows directly that
xk = λ
k−nv and yk = 0 for any k ≥ n.
Hence, we have lim supk→∞ ‖xk‖ =∞ and ‖yk‖ ≤ δ for
all k ∈ N.
2) Suppose |λ| = 1. A sequence of input is designed as
u´kn+j = kλ
nk+j−nQv + λnkuj (54)
for any k ∈ N and j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
We derive the expression of corresponding x´kn+j by induc-
tion. Suppose x´kn+j = kλnk+j−nv + λnkxj . Then,
x´kn+j+1 = Ax´kn+j +Bu´kn+j
= A[kλnk+j−nv + λnkxj ]
+B[kλnk+j−nQv + λnkuj ]
= kλnk+j−n(A+BQ)v + λnk(Axj +Buj)
= kλnk+j+1−nv + λnkxj+1
and
x´(k+1)n = Ax´kn+n−1 +Bu´kn+n−1
= A[kλnk−1v + λnkxn−1]
+B[kλnk−1Qv + λnkun−1]
= kλnk−1(A+BQ)v + λnk(Axn−1 +Bun−1)
= kλnkv + λnkv
= (k + 1)λ(k+1)n+0−nv + λ(k+1)nx0.
Thus, x´kn+j = kλnk+j−nv + λnkxj for any k ∈ N and
j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 is proved. This further implies that
y´kn+j = Cx´kn+j +Du´kn+j
= C[kλnk+j−nv + λnkxj ]
+D[kλnk+j−nQv + λnkuj ]
= kλnk+j−n[C +DQ]v + λnk[Cxj +Duj ]
= λnkyj .
Since |λ| = 1, we have that ‖y´kn+j‖ = ‖yj‖ ≤ δ for
any k ∈ N and j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Then we conclude that
lim supk→∞ ‖x´k‖ =∞ and ‖y´k‖ ≤ δ for all k ∈ N.
It is worth noting that the control input we have designed
can be complex valued, as the eigenvalue and eigenvector of
A + BQ may be complex valued. However, by linearity, we
know that if we inject the real (imaginary) part of the designed
sequence uk instead, then the state will be corresponding to the
real (imaginary) part of xk. Therefore, the divergence under
a complex input means that either the real or the imaginary
part of input can cause the divergence of state. Thus, we can
choose the real or the imaginary part of that input as a real
value input to make the system unstable.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Since the system in (23) is non-invertible, there exists T ∈ N
and a nonzero stealthy input sequence [u0 = u∗0, . . . , uT =
u∗T ] with u
∗
0 6= 0 such that [x1 = x∗1, . . . , xT = x∗T , xT+1 =
a1x
∗
1 + . . .+ aTx
∗
T ] and yk = 0 for all k ∈ N.
Then, with u0 = 0, we have that
u1 = 0, . . . , uT−1 = 0, uT = −a1u∗0
⇒ xT+1 = −a1x∗1
u1 = 0, . . . , uT−1 = −a2u∗0, uT = −a2u∗1
⇒= xT+1 = −a2x∗2
...
u1 = −aTu∗0, . . . , uT−1 = −aTu∗T−2, uT = −aTu∗T−1
⇒ xT+1 = −aTx∗T .
Let
u¯0 = u
∗
0, u¯1 = u
∗
1 − aTu∗0, . . . , u¯T = u∗T −
T−1∑
i=0
ai+1u
∗
i
and its corresponding state sequence is denoted by
x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯T+1.
Based on the combination property of linear system, the
input [u0 = u¯0, u1 = u¯1, . . . , uT = u¯T ] is nonzero and
stealthy, which makes xT+1 = x¯T+1 = 0.
For any λ ≥ 1, we take
x =
T∑
k=0
λ−kx¯k, u =
T∑
k=0
λ−ku¯k
and there exists a matrix Q such that
u = Qx.
Then,
(A+BQ)x = Ax+Bu =
T∑
k=0
λ−k(Ax¯k +Bu¯k)
=
T∑
k=0
λ−kx¯k+1 =
T+1∑
k=1
λ−k+1x¯k
= λ
T∑
k=0
λ−kx¯k = λx
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and
(C +DQ)x = Cx+Du =
T∑
k=0
λ−k(Cx¯k +Du¯k) = 0.
Combining with that x =
∑T
k=0 λ
−kx¯k is reachable for
(A,B), the conditions for the unstable reachable zero-dynamic
of (37) in Definition 5 are satisfied and it completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Firstly, we will show the boundness of ‖uk‖‖xk‖+1 .
Since the system in (23) is invertible, based on the results
in Corollary 1 and Lemma 1 of [32], we have
uk =
n−1∑
i=0
Pi[yk+i − CAixk],
where Pi, i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 are the gains to reconstruct the
input through outputs. Thus, it follows that
‖uk‖
‖xk‖+ 1 ≤
n−1∑
i=0
‖Pi‖[ ‖yk+i‖‖xk‖+ 1 + ‖CA
i‖ ‖xk‖‖xk‖+ 1]
≤
n−1∑
i=0
‖Pi‖(δ + ‖CAi‖).
Then, there exists U > 0 such that ‖uk‖‖xk‖+1 ≤ U for all
k ∈ N.
Denote the state xk under stealthy input sequence {ui,t :
t ∈ N} by xi,k. Taking arbitrary N ∈ N and P > 0, for
the vulnerability of system (23), we could choose a cluster
{{ui,t : t ∈ N} : i = 1, 2, . . .} such that8
‖x1,k1‖ > P,
‖xi+1,ki+1+q‖ > (i+ 1)P, for all q = −N, . . . , n,
‖xi+1,ki+1‖ > max
q=−N,...,n
(‖xi,ki‖, ‖xi+1,ki+1+q‖).(55)
And it follows directly that lim supi→∞ ‖xi,ki+q‖ =∞ for
any q = −N, . . . , n.
Based on the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem [38], there
exists a convergent subsequence for a bounded sequence. Since
‖ ui,k‖xi,k‖+ 1‖ ≤ U, ‖
xi,k
‖xi,k‖+ 1‖ ≤ 1,∀k ∈ N,
there exists a subsequence of {i : i ∈ N}, i.e., {ji : i ∈ N} ⊆
{i : i ∈ N}, such that
lim
i→∞
xji,kji+q
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
= xˇq, q = −N, . . . , 0, . . . , n
lim
i→∞
uji,kji+q
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
= uˇq, q = −N, . . . , 0, . . . , n.
8The peak sequence in (55) can be designed by
i0 = 0, ik+1 = min{j : ‖xj‖ > ‖xik‖}
if there exist stealthy {ut : t ∈ N} such that lim supk→∞ ‖xk‖ = ∞
For any q = −N, . . . , n− 1, we have
Axˇq +Buˇq = lim
i→∞
Axji,kji+q +Buji,kji+q
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
= lim
i→∞
xji,kji+q+1
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
= lim
i→∞
‖xji,kji+q+1‖+ 1
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
cq
xˇq+1, (56)
and
Cxˇq +Duˇq = lim
i→∞
Cxji,kji+q +Duji,kji+q
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
= lim
i→∞
yji,kji+q
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
= 0 (57)
as ‖yji,kji+q‖ ≤ δ and lim supi→∞ ‖xji,kji+q‖ =∞.
Since the state xk is n-dimensional, the vectors
xˇ−N , . . . , xˇ0, . . . , xˇn are linearly dependent. Then, a
subspace V is designed by
V = span[xˇ−N , . . . , xˇ0, . . . , xˇd],
where 0 ≤ d ≤ n− 1 such that span[xˇ−N , . . . , xˇ0, . . . , xˇd] =
span[xˇ−N , . . . , xˇ0, . . . , xˇd+1], i.e., xˇd+1 ∈ V .
Then, for any xˇ ∈ V and let xˇ = b−N xˇ−N + . . . + bdxˇd,
we have
Axˇ+B[b−N uˇ−N + . . .+ bduˇd]
= b−N [Axˇ−N +Buˇ−N ] + . . .+ bd[Axˇd +Buˇd]
= b−Nc−N xˇ−N+1 + . . .+ bdcdxˇd+1 ∈ V
and
Cxˇ+D[b−N uˇ−N + . . .+ bduˇd]
= b−N [Cxˇ−N +Duˇ−N ] + . . .+ bd[Cxˇd +Duˇd]
= 0.
Thus the subspace V is an invariant set satisfying (34).
Combining with that xˇ−N , . . . , xˇd are reachable for (A,B),
we have V ⊆ V ∗.
Based on the Lemma 4, since xˇ−N , . . . , xˇ0 ∈ V ∗, it follows
that there exists matrix Q such that
uˇq = Qxˇq,∀q = −N, . . . , 0. (58)
At last, we will show that A + BQ is unstable on V ∗ by
contradiction. Suppose that A+BQ is stable on V ∗, for that
N can be arbitrary large, there exists an integer p ≤ N such
that
‖(A+BQ)pυ‖ < υ (59)
for all υ ∈ V ∗.
From (58), it follows that
Axˇq +Buˇq = lim
i→∞
‖xji,kji+q+1‖+ 1
‖xji,kji+q‖+ 1
xˇq+1
= (A+BQ)xˇq.
for all q = −p,−p+ 1, . . . ,−1.
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The above further implies that
lim
i→∞
‖xji,kji‖+ 1
‖xji,kji−p‖+ 1
xˇ0
= lim
i→∞
‖xji,kji‖+ 1
‖xji,kji−1‖+ 1
· · · ‖xji,kji−p+1‖+ 1‖xji,kji−p‖+ 1
xˇ0
= (A+BQ)pxˇ−p. (60)
Based on the peak property defined in (55), we have that
limk→∞
‖xji,kji ‖+1
‖xji,kji−p‖+1
≥ 1.
Hence, together with ‖xˇ−p‖ = ‖xˇ0‖ = 1, the equation (60)
induces that
‖xˇ−p‖ = ‖xˇ0‖
≤ ‖ lim
i→∞
‖xji,kji‖+ 1
‖xji,kji−p‖+ 1
xˇ0‖
= ‖(A+BQ)pxˇ−p‖.
The inequality above contradicts with the assumption in
(59), thus A+BQ is unstable on V ∗ and one of its unstable
eigenvector v ∈ V ∗.
Since v ∈ V ∗ ⊆ span [B AB . . . An−1B], based on
the Lemma 4, the conditions for the unstable reachable zero-
dynamic of (37) in Definition 5 are satisfied and the proof is
finished.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Since the system in (1)-(2) is invulnerable, there exists M >
1 such that9
sup
(yat ,u
a
t ):0≤‖∆z‖∞,2≤δ
f(lim sup
t→∞
‖∆et‖2, lim sup
t→∞
‖∆zt‖2) ≤M,
(61)
where
f(a, b) =

a
b , if b > 0;
1, if a = 0, b = 0;
∞, if a > 0, b = 0.
Firstly, we will prove
sup
|z|=1
sup
0≤‖S(z)µ‖2≤δ
f(‖T (z)µ‖2, ‖S(z)µ‖2) ≤M (62)
by contradiction. Suppose that there exists ω ∈ [−pi, pi) and µ
such that ∥∥T (ejω)µ∥∥
2
‖S (ejω)µ‖2
> M. (63)
Let the attack input
ζt = e
jωtµ for all t ∈ N.
It then follows from (44) and (45) that
lim sup
t→∞
‖∆et‖2 = ‖T
(
ejω
)
µ‖2,
lim sup
t→∞
‖∆zt‖2 = ‖S
(
ejω
)
µ‖2.
9Suppose that there exists a sequence of attack such that ‖∆z‖∞,2 = 0
and 0 < ‖∆e‖∞,2 < ∞, based on the linearity, there must exists another
sequence of attack such that ‖∆z‖∞,2 = 0 and ‖∆e‖∞,2 = ∞. It
contradicts with invulnerability.
Since the magnitude of µ will not change (63), thus we let
‖µ‖2 small enough to make
∥∥S (ejω)µ∥∥
2
≤ ‖∆z‖∞,2 ≤ δ.
Hence, from (63),
lim supt→∞ ‖∆et‖2
lim supt→∞ ‖∆zt‖2
=
∥∥T (ejω)µ∥∥
2
‖S (ejω)µ‖2
> M,
and it contradicts with (61). Since the system is by assumption
invulnerable, we must have (62) and the result in (46) is thus
proved.
Then, we will separate the proof for (47) into two steps:
Step 1) Let S∗(z) be the conjugate transpose of S(z) and
A(z) = S(z)S∗(z). Let mˆ ∈ N be the maximum number of
linearly independent vectors wi(z), i = 1, · · · , mˆ, satisfying
A(z)wi(z) = 0 for all |z| = 1.
Since the entries of A(z) are rational functions, by solving
the above, it is easy to see that the entries of wi(z) can be
rational functions. Let m˜ = m− mˆ and vi(z), i = 1, · · · , m˜,
be a base for span⊥ {wi(z), i = 1, · · · , mˆ}. It is also easy
to make that the entries of vi(z) are rational functions. Let
V (z) = [v1, · · · , vm˜], W (z) = [w1, · · · , wmˆ] and U(z) =
[V,W ]. We then have
A(z) = U(z)
[
A˜(z) 0
0 0
]
U∗(z)
with det A˜(z) 6= 0 for at least one |z| = 1. Since A˜(z) =
V ∗(z)A(z)V (z) has rational entries, det A˜(z) is a rational
function. Therefore, det A˜(z) 6= 0 for almost all |z| = 1. It
then follows that
S(z)S†(z) = S(z)S∗(z) (S(z)S∗(z))†
= A(z)A†(z)
= U(z)
[
Im˜ 0
0 0
]
U∗(z),
where S†(z) denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse S(z)
and Im˜ denotes the identity matrix of dimension m˜. Hence,
the inverse z-transform SS† of S(z)S†(z) satisfies∥∥SS†∥∥
1,sp
<∞. (64)
Step 2) Our next step is to show that ‖R‖1,sp is finite. We
do so by contradiction. Suppose that ‖R‖1,sp =∞. For each
t ∈ Z, let ηt be a vector satisfying ‖ηt‖2 = 1 and
‖Rtηt‖2 = ‖Rt‖sp . (65)
We have
∞ =
∑
t∈Z
‖Rt‖sp =
∑
t∈Z
‖Rtηt‖2
≤
∑
t∈Z
‖Rtηt‖1 =
m∑
d=1
∑
t∈Z
|(Rtηt)d| ,
where (Rtηt)d is the d-th element of Rtηt.
Hence, there exists 1 ≤ d ≤ m such that∑
t∈Z
|(Rtηt)d| =∞.
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Then, there exists a sequence σt ∈ {−1, 1}, t ∈ Z,
satisfying ∑
t∈Z
σt (Rtηt)d =∞. (66)
Given any T , let ξt = σT−tηT−t for all t ∈ Z and
S† : Lm2 (Z) → Lma+pa2 (Z) denote the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of S. Put
ζ = S†ξ,
then
∆e = Tζ = Rξ,
∆z = Sζ = SS†ξ.
Using (66) we get
lim
T→∞
‖∆eT ‖2 = limT→∞
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=−T
RtξT−t
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= lim
T→∞
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=−T
σtRtηt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=∞. (67)
Also, using (64), for all t ∈ Z,
‖∆zt‖2 =
∥∥(SS†ξ)
t
∥∥
2
≤
∑
s∈Z
∥∥(SS†)
s
∥∥
sp
‖ξt−s‖2
≤ ∥∥SS†∥∥
1,sp
‖ξ‖∞,2 <∞. (68)
From (67) and (68), the system is vulnerable. Since by
assumption the system is invulnerable, we must then have
‖R‖1,sp <∞.
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